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The frontier is where smuggling is put
to the test: it is the battleground between
the smuggler and the customs officer. The
former has to create and take advantage of
an ‘information asymmetry’ against the
latter, typically by means of deception, since
the trafficked goods are carried through
hidden passages or concealed under the
guise of worthless objects. As a demiurge
connects two spheres –  the mundane world
and the realm of ideas –  in the delicate act
of creation, a smuggler finds or creates
paths crossing the frontier, linking domes-
tic territory to the outside world.
Today, it is known that information
technologies fl atten physical barriers, and
the sharing of data –  with undeniable prac-
tical benefits –  inevitably involves control
of information, which is held by a new kind
of power that, as such, has no limits other
than technological. In this context, we can
see in encryption5 the same contrast be-
tween reality and appearance that we find
in the act of smuggling: important infor-
If a sense of limitation is inherent in the
human condition, a smuggler can be seen
as the embodiment of a demiurgic figure,
who claims to challenge both nature and
institutions.1 In ancient times, a frontier was
seen as a zone potentially populated with
divinities –  the pomerium (sacred no-man’s-
land) in Rome (Coarelli, 2000)2 –  while in
the modern era it represented the absolute
independence of the sovereign in relation
to other states and religious authorities
(Hobbes, 1651). One can then easily un-
derstand why contraband has always been
severely punished: in ancient times, it was
a form of impiety against the ‘natural’ order
imposed by the political authority, in mod-
ern age, it was a sort of disenchantment for
the legal system and the bureaucracy. One
recalls a wide range of examples, from the
myth of Prometheus, the Titan who smug-
gled fire from the gods and delivered it to
humans,3 to Al Capone, the Italian mobster
who trafficked spirits during Prohibition4
in the United States. 
1 The demiurge is a semi-divine figure that we can find in the dialogues of Plato, especially in the Timaeus,
and in Gnostic mythology (Jonas, 1954). In the Platonic myth, it gives to matter the shape of ideas, and there-
fore connects experience and transcendence, while in the Gnostic view it expresses the confl ict between these
two dimensions. In the latter perspective, in which existence is a condition of suffering for humankind, this fig-
ure can be conceived as a guardian of the laws of nature and therefore as a kind of jailer. Salvation to humans,
therefore, can only be a sort of emancipation by appropriating of supernatural, hence demiurgical, powers.
Salvation identifies itself with freedom and implies the violation of the natural order. 
2 The pomerium was a strip of territory surrounding a settlement. It was considered sacred and therefore
impassable, so the transit could only be allowed through the town’s gates. 
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prometheus. 
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al_ Capone.
5 ‘Encryption’ is the process of converting ordinary information (called ‘plaintext’) into unintelligible text
(called ‘ciphertext’), while ‘decription’ identifies the reverse process. The cypher is the key that enables the
program to perform the processes of encoding and decoding (Norman, 1973). On the epistemological aspects
of espionage short after ‘9/11’ (Horn and Ogger, 2003). 
Federico Costantini
“Pretty Good Privacy”
– Smuggling in the 
Information Age
ment of enemies. There are several ways
in which this phenomenon occurs: the de-
livery may be made directly to the hostile
state, or through neutral countries; prohi-
bitions may also cover items specifically
designed for war, such as weapons and
munitions, or common goods that acquire
specific relevance by their destination, such
as food supplies for an army. Following in-
ternational customary law (de Groot,
1625), in order to facilitate diplomatic re-
lations and international business, states
issue specific lists of goods that, being con-
sidered or alleged contraband of war, are
forbidden or submitted to very strict reg-
ulations (Jessup and Deák, 1932, 1933 a,
b).
“Smuggling” refers to a diverse set of
phenomena involving the crossing of boun-
daries, which can be qualified as illegal for
several reasons: because the trade of cer-
tain goods is strictly regulated as such (i.e.
pharmaceuticals), due to infringement of
customs taxation, or because it is part of a
composite crime (i.e., trafficking in per-
sons).
Taken as a whole phenomenon, we can
identify two profiles for smuggling, which
involve: (1) the foundation for prohibi-
tions, and (2) the effectiveness of prescrip-
tions.8
(1) According to the conceptual model
of modern sovereignty, laws rely not on the
justice of conducts prescribed –  or the in-
justice of actions forbidden –  but on the ef-
fective power to punish infringements. This
means that, for example, trafficking in hu-
man beings shall be prohibited just because
the law requires it, not because it is an abo-
mination in and of itself. In accordance
with this view, a law that would make it le-
gitimate –  or actively promote it, for absur-
dity’s sake –  should be cherished and en-
forced (Kelsen 1960).
mation can be hidden inside insignificant
files. Indeed, coding plaintext and decoding
ciphertext respectively extend or tighten the
domain of available resources.6 Incredible
amounts of data can appear or vanish in a
moment: this kind of control is a power so
immense that hackers are often compared
with magicians7 (Stefik, 1996; Haker, Borg-
mann and van Erp 2005; Fioriglio 2010).
In this essay, I will address the problem
of smuggling on the new battlefield named
Information Society, where the information
asymmetry between smuggler and customs
officer occurs in a different way than it did
with respect to the border of ancient polit-
ical communities and the frontier of mod-
ern states, because the sole purpose of the
contrast between the two figures is the
control of information. After providing some
legal premises for the concept of smug-
gling and a few technical details about
cryptography, I will focus on a legal case
that occurred nearly twenty years ago con-
cerning the ‘smuggling’ of the encryption
system called “Pretty Good Privacy” (hence-
forth “PGP”) across US borders. I shall com-
ment briefl y on its most significant legal is-
sues, and finally I will draw some theoret-
ical conclusions.
Preliminary legal clarifi cations
From a strictly legal point of view, one can
make a distinction between two kinds of
activity concerning contraband: illegal
trade occurring when a state’s legal system
is in danger, referred to as “contraband of
war”, and the activity in peacetime com-
monly called “smuggling”. It is useful to
provide explanations for both concepts.
The term “contraband of war” refers to
a set of transactions in international trade
that is intended to prevent the procure-
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6 The message contained in ‘cypertext’ can not be understood without the key that enables the encoding
process. In this sense owning the access code means to widen the horizons of the available information.
7 The figure of the ‘computer wizard’ symbolically expresses the supernatural powers of the demiurge. Tech-
nology is a tool of salvation, knowledge of which is the guarantee of freedom and is reserved for a select few.
8 Hereinafter I will use the word ‘smuggling’ in a general sense.
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of increasingly sophisticated devices (me-
chanical, electrical, electronic, quantum
theory based) to encode and decode com-
munications. 
Of the two kinds of existing cryptogra-
phy –  ‘symmetric’ and ‘asymmetric’10 –  the
latter (and most often used) was invented
in 1976 at Stanford University by Whitfield
Diffie and Martin Hellman (Diffie and Hell-
man 1976a, b). According to the theoreti-
cal model they proposed, soon after three
researchers at MIT –  Ronald Rivers, Adi
Shamir and Leonard Aldeman –  developed
a technology –  named RSA –  that has been
the basis of security in electronic commu-
nications since then.11
During the Cold War the U.S. divided
technologies into two categories: the tools
that had an exclusive military application,
called “munitions”, were entrusted of the
State Department, and civil technologies
also suitable for exploitation in war, called
“dual use technologies”, were delegated to
the Department of Commerce. In 1976 the
U.S. government issued the AECA (Arms
Export Control Act),12 which provides a
very strict regime for arms exports con-
tained in the ITAR (International Traffic in
Arms Regulations).13 Within ITAR the USML
(United States Munitions List)14 provided
a very detailed list of goods whose export
required permission from the Department
of State The AECA included cryptographic
systems in the USML,15 thereby establish-
ing that the export of cryptographic sys-
tems would be severely punished as ‘con-
(2) In international commerce, goods
traded are increasingly accompanied by
documents that represent them (for exam-
ple, the Air Way Bill for goods carried by
planes). Thus, the customs control is per-
formed indirectly: not by monitoring the
displacement of physical goods, but by
checking their shipping documents. Conse-
quently, we can also say that smuggling
has changed in the ‘physical world’: it has
become less focused on the hidden move-
ment of things across the border, and more
focused on the avoidance of customs pro-
cedures (for example, with forgery of in-
voices). Therefore, deception remains a key
feature of smuggling.
Technical ex planations
Encryption has always been important, but
in the Information Age it became crucial.
Just as decency is part of human nature,
and society requires that certain matters
be kept confidential, governments have
often made use of encryption tools in the
transmission of messages of strategic im-
portance (i.e., the greek scytale, the Roman
Caesar’s cipher). Recently, as a result of
the importance of information in wartime
(for example the breaking of the Enigma
Code in World War II which was pivotal for
the Allied victory),9 the development of
automation technologies has enabled the
improvement of more complex methods –
cryptographic systems –  requiring the use
9 It is known that the communications of the Nazi army were based on a rather advanced encryption that was
decoded by a group of British researchers. In this discovery, a decisive contribution was provided by Alan Mathi-
son Turing, a famous mathematical genius whose studies are moreover crucial to the birth of artificial intel-
ligence.
10 In ‘symmetric’ cryptography, the key used for encryption is the same as that used for decoding; it is older,
and is the only one to be used until the 1970s. In the 1960s, IBM introduced a particular algorithm, DES (Data
Encryption Standard), which was adopted and strengthened by the NSA (National Security Agency). Here the
keys are different: one is called ‘private’, the other ‘public’, hence the ‘asymmetry’ in this kind of cryptography.
11 Rivest, R.L., A. Shamir, and L.M. Adleman, ‘Cryptographic communications system and method’, U.S.
patent # 4405829, 1983.
12 Title II of Pub. L. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729, enacted June 30, 1976, now in Title 22 USC § 2778 and § 2794 (7).
13 In Title 22 CFR, Title 22, Chapter I, Subchapter M, Parts 120-130.
14 In Title 22 CFR, Title 22, Chapter I, Subchapter M, Part 121.1.
15 Title 22 C.F.R. 121.1 (X III)(b)(1) (1994): “cryptographic... software with the capability of maintaining
secrecy or confidentiality of information or information systems”.
ernment access to messages through de-
vices placed by the producers in communi-
cation equipment.18 Shortly before the pro-
posal was shelved in response to public pro-
tests, a computer scientist and civil activist
named Philip R. Zimmermann wrote a pub-
lic-key encryption software package for the
protection of electronic mail with the aim
of defending citizens’ freedom of speech.19
The 1.0 DOS version of program was re-
leased freely to his friends and –  it seems,
not by the author –  was uploaded on the
Internet, which then had 30 million users.
Various reactions were immediately un-
chained: i.e., activists all over the country,
fearing that government could inhibit the
spread of the program, uploaded it on dif-
ferent BBS20 by connecting their comput-
ers to public telephones (Kerben 1997, 129),
while some providers –  such as CompuSer-
ve Inc. –  removed the software from their
servers to avoid being sued.21
(2) In 1993, federal prosecutors began
investigations against Zimmermann for the
infringement of AECA (Arms Export Con-
trol Act) and ITAR (International Traffic in
traband of war’.16 Although cryptography
was included in the USML, financial organi-
zations were pressing for permission to use
cryptographic systems worldwide in order
to protect electronic transactions. The fed-
eral government granted the use of crypto-
graphy only to large companies able to ma-
nage very high security standards. Later,
in 1992, several companies, gathered in
the Software Publishers Association, made
an agreement with the U.S. government for
permission to export software with ‘weak’
encryption.17
The “Pretty Good Privacy” case
In order to explain the famous legal case
concerning the ‘smuggling’ of the crypto-
graphic technology called PGP, I will con-
sider the following topics: (1) the circum-
stances in which the case took place, (2) the
judicial proceedings and (3) the outcome
and subsequent events.
(1) In 1991, the U.S. Senate was debat-
ing a bill that would have granted the gov-
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16 “Any person that knowingly violates the Export Administration Act (EAA) or the regulations of, is subject
to a fine of up to five times the value of the exports involved or $  50,000 whichever is greater, or imprisonment
of up to five years or both” 50 U.S.C. 2410(a) (1994); and: “Any person that willfully violates the EAA or the
regulations of, is subject to five times the value of the exports up to $  1,000,000 ($  250,000 for an individual),
or up to ten years of imprisonment, or both” 50 U.S.C. 2410(b)(1)(A)(B); and finally: “The violation of the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA) or the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) is punishable by a
fine up to $  1,000,000, or imprisonment of up to ten years, or both.” 22 U.S.C. 2778 (c) (1994. See also: 22
C.F.R. 127.3 (1996).
17 The encryption was considered ‘weak’ if the ‘symmetric’ key was lower than 40-bit or the ‘asymmetric’ key
was below 512-bit. For example, the Netscape browser was first released in two versions, depending on the
security protocol SSL, international (40-bit) and domestic (128-bit, which was later reduced to the same
length of the international version). The 40-bits encryption was not at all sure, as could be violated in two
days. Users protested because the government imposed limits on the safety of their financial transactions in
the name of national security.
18 Senate Bill 266 “Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Act”, Introduced on January 24, 1991.
19 https://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/background/index.html. Zimmermann wrote the program in
just six months. During this time, he was out of work and used all the savings of his family, so that he was
likely to be evicted with his wife and two children. The software name “Pretty Good Privacy” comes from
“Ralph’s Pretty Good Grocery” in humorist Garrison Keillor’s “Prairie Home Companion” radio show.
20 The BBS (Bulletin Board Systems) were a tool for sharing information very popular before the advent of
the World Wide Web. 
21 The first commercial disputes also arose: RSA Data Security Inc., which held the license for the distribution
of the RSA technology on US territory, undertook a legal action against Zimmermann, claiming that the dif-
fusion of PGP had infringed their rights. In order to resist their claims, Zimmermann signed a distribution
sub-license with Viacrypt (Phoenix), which was also a dealer of the RSA: at that time, PGP was sold for $ 100
(DOS version) and $ 125 (Windows version). Another company, the Austin Code Work (Austin, Texas), began
distributing software similar to PGP called Moby Crypto, containing encryption.
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As written by John Perry Barlow, the
visionary prophet of cyber culture (and
former lyricist for “The Grateful Dead”) 
“The genie of guerrilla cryptography is
out of the bottle. No one, not even its
maker, can stuff it back in or keep it
within what America laughably calls its
borders. The genie is all over the Net. It’s
in your hands as you hold this book.
Summon it with a conscience. But be
prepared to summon it if you must.”
(Barlow, 1995)
On January 11, 1996, the federal investi-
gation against Zimmermann ended with
the archiving of charges.24 The press state-
ment of an assistant attorney general was
very laconic: “No change in the law, no
change in policy. If you’re planning on mak-
ing encryption available over the Internet,
or other means, better check with the State
Department first.” (Kerben 1997: 131). 
Soon after, Zimmermann yielded the
rights on his algorithm to a company named
Network Associates Inc., which in 2002
was acquired by PGP Inc., which was merg-
ed with Symantec Corporation in 2010. 
(3) From the statement of the public
prosecutor, we can understand that the
government did not admit defeat, yet we
can guess that something was going to
happen. Indeed, it happened very soon. In
July 1996, the US government, along with
thirty-three other countries, signed an in-
ternational agreement, the “ Wassenaar Ar-
rangement on Export Controls for Conventio-
Arms Regulations), because PGP enabled
users to encrypt their files with extremely
“strong” keys (512-bit, 1024-bit, 1280-bit,
2048-bit) that far exceed those permitted
by law.22 In February, US Customs agents
showed up at Zimmermann’s home to seize
documents concerning PGP.23 On Novem-
ber 4, 1994 Zimmermann was arrested at
customs in the International Airport of Dul-
les (Colorado), returning from travel in
Europe (Stay 1997, 581). On that journey
Zimmermann was writing the book pub-
lished in 1995 under the title PGP Source
Code and Internals (Zimmermann 1995).
In it, he transcribed the whole source code
of his program, so that anyone in the world
–  beyond the US border –  could re-write
the software. 
It needs to be emphasized that to ‘smug-
gle’ the program, Zimmermann did not
pass any frontier, he did not even transmit
anything through the Internet; he created
instead an intellectual work: just a book,
but one symbolic of freedom of expression.
Some very delicate issues arose. We can
express them in three questions:
(1) How could the US government pro-
secute a citizen for exercising freedom,
which is the pillar of the American Dream? 
(2) How could the US government in-
dict one single person, while everyone in
the world already was using PGP?
(3) How could the US government con-
demn the inventor of a system that had be-
come a de facto technological standard
(Atkins, Stallings, and Zimmermann 1996,
Callas et al. 2007)? 
22 Just to give an idea of the effectiveness of PGP, I can report that it was said that a decent computer would
have taken about 280,000 years to force open the encryption (Kerben, 1997) p., 129.
23 In September 1994, a Federal Grand Jury in San Jose (California) issues subpoenas to Viacrypt –  namely
on September 9, 1994 –  and to Austin Work Code (Austin, Texas) –  precisely on September 17, 1994 –  requir-
ing evidence concerning the distribution of PGP.
24 We can read from the text of the provision that the action performed by Zimmermann fits perfectly in the
provision of Title 22 CFR § 121.1, Category X III(b) (1995), which forbids export of: “Information Security
Systems and equipment, cryptographic devices, software, and components specifically designed or modified
therefore, including: (1) Cryptographic (including key management) systems, equipment, assemblies, mod-
ules, integrated circuits, components or software with the capability of maintaining secrecy or confidentiality
of information or information systems, except cryptographic equipment and software as follows: (i) Restrict-
ed to decryption functions specifically designed to allow the execution of copy protected software, provided
the decryption functions are not user-accessible.”.
Legal issues in the PGP case
From a legal perspective, the issues raised
by the PGP case are still very much present,
even after twenty years. Considering the
reasons why smuggling encryption was
considered legitimate despite the violation
of severe prohibitions, I can identify three
main profiles that correspond to the above-
mentioned questions. They involve: (1) the
protection of freedom of expression, (2)
the safeguard of privacy and (3) the right to
legal defence. It is useful to scrutinize each
profile. 
(1) It is known that the First Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution protects free-
dom of expression.30 This is the principle,
as we have seen, invoked by Zimmermann
in support of his action. The protection of
freedom of speech is also contained in the
discipline of the ITAR, and particularly in
the provision that excludes the application
of the prohibitions in the case of “public
domain”.31 The courts interpreted these
regulations holding that the definition of
the list of prohibited goods were exempt
from judicial review –  as an expression of
sovereignty –  and thus the inclusion of en-
cryption could not have been discussed.32
nal Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Techno-
logies”,25 which prescribed that the export
of cryptographic systems were subject to
government authorization if they exceeded
56bit keys (symmetric encryption) or 512
bit (asymmetric cryptography). On October
1, 1996, Vice President Al Gore announced
the administration’s intention to remove
cryptographic systems from USML and pla-
ce them under control of the Department
of Commerce, so that the authorization
would not have to be requested from the
Department of State.26 On November 16,
1996, the US Government proposed a new
initiative called the “Clipper Chip III”, pur-
suant that the export of ‘strong’ encryption
would be allowed if equipped with a key
recovery system.27 More recently, after an
initial partial disclosure in 1999, in 2009
the federal government submitted the ex-
port of cryptography to the Export Admin-
istration Regulations (EAR),28 putting it
under the supervision of the Department
of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and
Security. The regime, as provided in the
Commerce Control List,29 draws a rather
complex system of restrictions divided by
product type and destination (the states
are divided into groups A, B, C, E).
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25 The participating states –  the number of which nowadays has reached forty-one –  regularly meet in Vien-
na. See www.wassenaar.org. The European Union has established a legal framework pursuing this interna-
tional agreement, see: Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of May 5, 2009 “setting up a Community regime
for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items”, in OJ L 134, 29.5.2009, p. 1-269,
recently amended with Regulation (EU) No 599/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
April 16, 2014 “amending Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the
control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items”, in OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 79-83.
Encryption is contained in Annex I, ‘List of dual-use items’, Category 5 –  Part 2 ‘Information security’. The
term ‘Export’ is extensively defined as follows: “transmission of software or technology by electronic media,
including by fax, telephone, electronic mail or any other electronic means to a destination outside the
European Community; it includes making available in an electronic form such software and technology to
legal and natural persons and partnerships outside the Community. Export also applies to oral transmission
of technology when the technology is described over the telephone” art. 2 c. 2 (iii), Reg. (EC) 428/2009.
26 Executive Order No. 13,026, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,767 (1996), signed by the President on November 15, 1996.
27 See recently http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/DOC_ 0006231614.pdf (Schwartzbeck, 1997).
28 Title 15 C.F.R. Chapter VII, Subchapter C.
29 Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 Category 5 Part 2 –  Information Security.
30 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”, The First Amendment, U.S. Constitution. 
31 “(a) Public domain means information which is published and which is generally accessible or available
to the public: (1) Through sales at newsstands and bookstores; [ … ] ” 22 CFR Chapter I, Subchapter M, Part
120, § 120.11.
32 See: United States v. Martinez 904 F2d 601 (11th Cir 1990), (Stay 1997, 600).
303
tiality of communication is a value whose
defence in courts has always been very chal-
lenging, as shown by the cases Olmstead37
and Katz.38
(3) The principle established by the
Fifth Amendment39 draws out a further as-
pect of cryptography, that here for lack of
space I can only mention. The privilege
against self-incrimination becomes rele-
vant as it inhibits the state to force a per-
son –  i.e. a suspect –  to reveal the creden-
tials necessary to access information that
he had previously encrypted. Yet, very re-
cently a court of Virginia Beach Circuit
Court (2nd Judicial Circuit of Virginia) de-
cided that this rule does not apply to bio-
metrics (such as fingerprints), because
they don’t involve an act of will, but rather
they are similar to DNA samples: just a
measurable quality of the physical body
(Hulette 2014). This solution seems con-
tradictory, because the same information
can receive different legal protection de-
pending on the system of protection pre-
viously chosen by the owner.
However they stated that depending on
the circumstances, encryption, as such,
could also be considered “public domain”
and then be included in the exception that
permitted free circulation within national
territory. The federal government expres-
sed its position on the matter in other legal
cases, with quite questionable arguments:
in the “Karn case”, granting the export of
a book containing lines of code, but not of
an identical executable file;33 in the “Bern-
stein case”, on the pretence that the pro-
hibition on the use of foreign languages in
communications under rules that came into
force during World War II34 was enforce-
able in peacetime; in the “Junger case”, pre-
tending that the exclusion applied to teach-
ing cryptography  at a university to non-
citizens students.35
(2) The Fourth Amendment36 has been
traditionally considered the conceptual
pillar of the doctrine of privacy, (Warren
and Brandeis 1890), but does not play a
special role in the protection of encryption,
as if it was overshadowed by the debate on
freedom of expression. Moreover, confiden-
33 On February 12, 1994 Phil Karn asked the Department of State whether approval was required to export
a book containing lines of code and documentation of a cryptographic program (Schneier, 1993). The answer
was that this did not require permission. On March 9, 1994, he asked if it could be exported in the digital
version and received a negative response by the same officer, William B. Robinson. In the judgment on the
appeal of the denial, the government refused to include the export of software as freedom of expression and
the judge agreed this position. See: Karn v. United States Department of State, No. 95-CV-01812 (D.D.C. filed
Sept. 21, 1995).
34 See: 32 CFR § 1801.48 (1945). It was forbidden not only to speak in languages other than English, French,
Portuguese and Spanish, but also to use “any word, term, phraseology or language having a double meaning”.
See: Bernstein v. United States Department of State, No. C95-0582-MHP (N.D. Cal. filed February 21, 1995).
In this case, the Court decided in favour of the export of encryption. See: (Reiman, 1996).
35 Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000).
36 “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized”, The Fourth Amendment, U.S. Constitution.
37 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). With this decision, which contains the famous dissenting
opinion of Justice Brandeis, was recognized as legitimate wiretapping of a bootlegger without judicial au-
thorization.
38 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). This judgment overruled the Olmstead sentence, recognizing
the right to privacy of a bookie who used a pay phone to collect bets.
39 “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”, The Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution.
relationship between smuggling and en-
cryption is two-sided, because encryption
could be a tool of traditional contraband,
and smuggling could be seen as a sort of
encryption. Hereinafter I deepen both ob-
servations.
(1) Zimmermann claimed to have in-
vented PGP in the name of freedom of ex-
pression, and exported it to support dissi-
dents fighting totalitarian regimes. In this
sense, encryption can be seen as a practical
tool for spreading democracy. Zimmer-
mann was a brilliant smuggler, certainly:
he took advantage of an exception in the
law, hiding the source code in plain sight,
where everyone could see it. He was very
lucky too, if we think about what happened
recently to Edward Snowden or Edward
Bradley/Chelsea Elizabeth Manning. To-
day, however, this view reveals all its naï-
veté not only because it does not takes into
account the ‘neutrality’ of technology, as
scholars pointed out,41 but also because
it was, after all, ideological (Fukuyama,
1992). We have seen in recent years that,
in addition to the most peaceful dissidents,
even ruthless terrorists can benefit from en-
cryption, and on this issue we do not find a
satisfactory response within the ideologi-
cal confl ict between libertarianism and au-
thoritarianism. 
(2) To define smuggling as a semantic
process means to focus on ‘asymmetric in-
formation’, which constitutes its epistemo-
logical structure, as introduced in the fore-
word of this article. The best perspective on
the issue is given by the acknowledgment
that the one who encodes a message has
first-hand control of the information, and
Conclusions on PGP and 
“smuggling technologies”
In the information age, we can assume that
our territory is defined by the domain of
available resources, information is the good
carried, and a boundary consists only of
reaching the limit of data processing ca-
pacity. Secrets are the most valuable kind
of information, and the most precious tech-
nologies are those that allow maintaining
or eradicating them. Two observations can
be made from this perspective:
(1) The availability of resources is in-
dependent of geographic location. Informa-
tion is not a physical entity to move, nei-
ther a document to be checked, but an im-
material and volatile object, so that in
order to prevent contraband the sovereign
should isolate completely its territory from
the rest of the world, however this is im-
possible.
(2) The control of information is a
measure of power in the physical world. For
states, potentially any information that is
not at hand is a threat, thus secrecy as such
has to be removed, and transparency has
to be promoted in the name of national se-
curity. 
The world community of Internet users
considers Zimmermann a hero.40 Today
cryptography is widely used in order to en-
sure confidentiality, data integrity, authen-
tication, and non-repudiation (i.e., electro-
nic commerce, e-mail messages, electronic
signatures, Digital Rights Management),
but it’s difficult to say that the case was a
complete victory for supporters of smug-
gling. Indeed, the PGP case teaches that the
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40 http://www.internethalloffame.org/inductees/philip-zimmermann.
41 Zimmermann insisted on this point during a hearing held on June 26, 1996 in front of the “Subcommittee
on Science Technology and Space of the US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation.”
Encryption is cherished as a tool for the protection of freedom of thought, available to opponents of totalita-
rian regimes, and ultimately as an instrument of transparency and democracy. In this regard, Zimmermann
added “The information revolution... contributed to the fall of the Soviet Empire”, https://www.philzimmer
mann.com/EN/testimony/index.html. This is quite an optimistic perspective, since technology is a neutral
tool, which can be used for good and evil. See: (Metzl 1996, Ball, Girouard, and Chapman 1997). Ball et al.,
criticizing Metzl, point out three problems and three solutions in the use of information technology by or-
ganizations involved in protecting Human Rights: (1) message authenticity and integrity, solved by digital
signatures; (2) content surveillance, solved by encryption; (3) traffic analysis, solved by anonymous remailers.
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guish between “contraband of war” and
“smuggling” since, for example, it is no
longer necessary to carry weapons across
a border: one could find files on the Inter-
net43 containing layouts for 3D-printing
them where ever needed (Feinberg, 2014). 
Facing this scenario, nevertheless, I
hope there is still an option for some sort of
contraband to exist. Maybe we should learn
to smuggle ourselves, as human beings, by
circumventing the control of information.
We should certainly defend our moral free-
dom in the face of the system, that is to
say, we should grow our intelligence in
order to recognize the distinction between
good and evil as something real, something
that no one can manipulate or encrypt. Let
us say it is an ‘art’ that we need to learn, and
as such, it cannot be controlled by a com-
puter.
ultimately that there is no substantial dif-
ference between a smuggler and a customs
officer.42 For states, as for companies and
common people, it becomes crucial to own
technologies that preserve secrets and to
penetrate those of others. The purpose for
which it is done does not matter, nor the
entity that holds it. Control of information
is a power to which everyone has to bow
down, just as in a new religion.
The advent of the information age has
not only weakened physical boundaries,
but it has also raised higher barriers, de-
fined as ‘cyber borders’. The Internet itself
has been weaponized and increasingly put
under military control (Schmitt, 2013). As
a result, any electronic signal theoretically
could fall into cyberwarfare, and thus be
filtered, scanned, or intercepted. Therefore
it doesn’t makes sense anymore to distin-
42 The two positions are perfectly symmetrical: someone (the smuggler) encrypts the message preventing
others (the customs officer) to access the content that, being hidden, fl ows through customs control, unless
someone (the customs officer) would find the credentials, and then access the ciphertext, overcoming the
barriers (the cypher) posed by the sender (the smuggler).
43 For example, paying them in Bitcoin, which is an encrypted currency, and downloading them from the
Deep Web.
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